The industrial systems that power, hydrate, feed, and transport modern society are undergoing a profound digital shift. For decades, the machinery inside manufacturing plants, electrical grids, and water treatment facilities operated in physical isolation. Today, these systems are deeply interconnected with corporate networks, cloud environments, and remote access software.
This digital convergence unlocks massive operational efficiencies, but it also creates an expansive and attractive attack surface for modern cyber criminals. Protecting these physical systems requires a highly specialized discipline known as Operational Technology (OT) cyber security. Unlike traditional corporate data security, a failure in the OT domain moves past leaked files and disrupted emails. It carries immediate, real-world consequences for critical infrastructure, economic stability, and human safety.
Understanding Operational Technology
Operational Technology encompasses the entire ecosystem of hardware, software, and communication protocols used to monitor, control, and automate physical industrial operations. While traditional IT manages the flow of data across business applications, OT interacts directly with physical equipment. It is the technology that dictates how fast a turbine spins, when a valve opens, and how chemicals are dosed into public drinking water.
To understand the scope of OT cybersecurity, it is necessary to look at the primary components that drive these physical environments:
- Industrial Control Systems (ICS): The overarching category that includes combinations of hardware and software used to operate and support industrial automation.
- Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA): Systems designed to provide high-level, centralized monitoring and supervisory control over vast, geographically distributed operations, such as thousands of miles of oil and gas pipelines.
- Distributed Control Systems (DCS): Automated control architectures deployed within a localized facility, like a refinery or chemical plant, to manage continuous manufacturing processes.
- Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs): Ruggedized, solid-state industrial computers designed to survive harsh factory conditions. They take real-time inputs from sensors, execute pre-programmed logic, and deliver outputs to machinery.
- Human-Machine Interfaces (HMIs): The localized display screens and control panels that allow plant engineers and operators to view system statuses, modify settings, and manually override automated processes.
- Remote Terminal Units (RTUs): Microprocessor-controlled electronic devices that connect physical objects in the field to SCADA or DCS telemetry loops.
- Industrial Sensors and Actuators: The baseline components that physically measure variables like temperature, pressure, or flow, and the physical mechanisms that execute movements based on control signals.
In a practical application, such as a large-scale automotive manufacturing plant, these systems coordinate robotic arms, manage assembly lines, and monitor machine vibration to optimize uptime. In a municipal wastewater facility, the same class of technologies regulates pumps, filtration beds, and chemical treatment levels.
The core distinction between these systems and standard office computers lies in the stakes of downtime. If a corporate email server goes offline for an hour, productivity stalls. If an OT control system drops offline or executes an erroneous command, an entire factory line halts instantly, or worse, critical utility services fail for entire populations.
Why Operational Technology Cyber Security Matters
For generations, the primary defense mechanism for industrial systems was an air gap. This concept relied on the complete physical separation of factory floor networks from any external connectivity, including the corporate office and the internet. Security through obscurity and isolation was the standard operating model.
That isolated architecture is gone. The pressure to improve efficiency, reduce maintenance overhead, and leverage data analytics has driven an aggressive integration of OT and IT environments.
Organizations now routinely connect their core industrial networks to several external platforms:
- Enterprise resource planning software and corporate databases
- Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) sensors for monitoring predictive maintenance
- Cloud-hosted data analytics platforms for real-time performance optimization
- Third-party vendor networks for remote diagnostic and maintenance services
While this interconnectedness streamlines business operations, it removes the traditional air gap. It effectively exposes previously hidden industrial assets to the global threat landscape.
Threat actors, ranging from financially motivated ransomware syndicates to highly sophisticated nation-state groups, have shifted their focus toward OT networks. They recognize that interrupting a physical operation creates immense financial and political leverage.
The downstream impact of an exploitation within an OT environment goes far beyond digital remediation costs. It can materialize as severe physical and financial liabilities:
- Immediate cessation of production lines, leading to unrecoverable contractual financial penalties
- Extreme physical damage to multi-million dollar machinery, requiring months for replacement or repair
- Direct threats to workforce safety and public health through compromised hazardous material controls
- Stringent regulatory fines for environmental contamination or critical infrastructure outages
- Protracted supply chain disruptions that cascade through secondary and tertiary markets
For operators of critical infrastructure, securing these environments is no longer categorized as a technical IT hurdle. It is treated as a fundamental element of corporate governance and national security risk management.
How OT Cyber Security Works
The foundational philosophy of OT cybersecurity differs sharply from traditional corporate IT defense. IT security structures its priorities around the CIA Triad, placing Confidentiality at the apex, followed by Integrity, and finally Availability. The primary goal is to prevent unauthorized data access.
In contrast, the OT security paradigm flips this model completely, prioritizing Safety, Availability, and Reliability.
Safety
The absolute priority of any industrial facility is the physical preservation of human life, community environments, and the machinery itself. Security controls must ensure that a cyber attack cannot override safety interlocks or trigger hazardous physical conditions.
Availability
Industrial networks must remain operational. Systems must remain functional and accessible around the clock because unexpected downtime can result in massive financial losses or immediate public crises, such as power grid failures.
Reliability
Industrial processes depend on precision and predictability. Security measures cannot introduce latency into network communications, nor can they alter the timing of commands sent to field controllers. A delay of milliseconds in a high-speed manufacturing environment can ruin product batches or cause mechanical failures.
To uphold these principles without disrupting the deterministic nature of industrial environments, a modern OT cyber security program integrates a distinct set of operational pillars:
- Passive asset discovery tools that catalog every IP-connected device without disrupting operational traffic
- Network segmentation architectures that isolate control planes from business communication paths
- Granular access management protocols that restrict internal and external user privileges
- Continuous, signature-based and behavioral threat monitoring tailored for industrial communication protocols
- Risk-informed vulnerability management that balances patching cycles with scheduled facility shutdowns
Implementing these safeguards ensures that security teams can actively detect and contain anomalies before an intrusion compromises physical operations.
Core Components of an OT Environment
Securing an industrial footprint requires a granular understanding of the operational stack. Industrial architectures are typically categorized using the Purdue Model, an industry standard that segments enterprise and industrial control networks into distinct functional layers.
At the lowest levels (Layers 0 through 2), systems interface directly with physical processes. This is where PLCs execute localized logic based on real-time data received from field sensors. These field devices read physical states, such as pressure differentials in a natural gas pipeline, and translate them into digital telemetry.
At the middle management layer (Layer 3), SCADA systems and DCS frameworks aggregate data from multiple local controllers to provide comprehensive oversight. In a large electric utility, the SCADA platform allows operators in a central control room to view power distributions across multiple substations, adjust voltage levels, and manage network loads remotely.
A critical point of vulnerability within these layers resides in the legacy communication protocols used by the devices to talk to one another. Protocols such as Modbus, DNP3, PROFINET, EtherNet/IP, and OPC UA were originally engineered decades ago. They were built for maximum speed, reliability, and deterministic behavior over isolated serial lines, not for security.
Consequently, many legacy variations of these protocols lack inherent security features. They often communicate in plain text without encryption, contain no built-in mechanism for cryptographic device authentication, and accept commands from any system that addresses them.
This protocol vulnerability means that if an attacker successfully breaches the network layer housing these devices, they can issue unauthorized commands directly to physical hardware without triggering basic system rejections.
Major Threats Facing OT Environments
The modern industrial landscape faces an array of threat vectors that capitalize on structural, technological, and procedural gaps.
Ransomware Attacks
Ransomware is currently the most frequent disruption vector for industrial enterprises. While cyber criminals initially targeted corporate data networks, they increasingly exploit IT-OT interconnections. Attackers understand that manufacturing entities face devastating losses for every hour a production line sits idle, making them highly susceptible to extortion demands.
Supply Chain Compromises
Industrial operations rely on a massive network of original equipment manufacturers, specialized system integrators, and engineering firms. These third parties often maintain persistent remote access connections into the heart of the OT environment to monitor performance and deploy software updates. If an attacker compromises a vendor’s corporate network, they can use legitimate, trusted remote access tunnels to pivot directly into the client’s industrial control zone.
Legacy System Vulnerabilities
It is common to find operational machinery that has been running continuously for fifteen, twenty, or thirty years. These legacy platforms were built long before modern cyber threats existed. They run obsolete operating systems, lack the processing power to support encryption, and cannot accept modern endpoint protection agents. Furthermore, patching these devices requires taking production lines offline, an action operators resist due to the immediate loss of revenue.
Insider Threats
Industrial environments are highly complex and sensitive to configuration changes. An insider threat does not always involve a malicious actor seeking to sabotage a facility. It frequently manifests as an untrained contractor or well-intentioned employee who introduces a compromised USB drive into an HMI terminal or misconfigures a network switch, causing an accidental self-inflicted denial-of-service condition across the control network.
Nation-State Operations
Critical infrastructure sectors, particularly energy, water, and transport, are persistent targets for advanced persistent threats (APTs) sponsored by foreign states. These adversaries are typically not motivated by financial extortion. Instead, their objective is long-term persistence, reconnaissance, and pre-positioning. They embed themselves within industrial control layers to maintain the capability to disrupt critical public services during geopolitical conflicts.
Real-World OT Cyber Security Incidents
The risks associated with unsecured operational technology are illustrated by historical events that have redefined how national security and corporate leadership view industrial cyber defense.
One of the most consequential events in the United States occurred in 2021, when a ransomware attack struck the Colonial Pipeline Company. The intrusion originated on the corporate IT side, compromising business applications and billing systems.
Because the company lacked absolute visibility and verifiable segmentation to prove the ransomware could not cross into the operational pipeline control plane, leadership shut down the physical fuel pipeline out of caution. This decision caused regional fuel shortages, panic buying, and spikes in gasoline prices across the eastern seaboard, showing how an IT-centric attack can paralyze physical infrastructure.
Similarly, municipal water facilities across the country have faced escalating cyber intrusions. In multiple documented cases, threat actors targeted small-to-midsize water treatment plants by exploiting unprotected, internet-facing HMI systems that used weak or default administrative credentials.
Once inside, unauthorized users attempted to alter critical chemical dosing levels, such as sodium hydroxide concentrations. While automated safety thresholds or alert plant operators caught and reversed these changes before contaminated water reached consumers, these events underscored the vulnerability of local public utilities.
The manufacturing sector remains a primary target for continuous extortion. Recent data confirms that manufacturing accounts for a massive share of all industrial ransomware incidents globally. These attacks regularly paralyze factory automation loops, lock down distribution logistics systems, and force operators to revert to manual processes or endure prolonged operational standstills that carry multi-million dollar recovery price tags.
Key Security Controls for OT Environments
Defending an industrial network requires moving away from traditional IT endpoint tools, which can inadvertently crash fragile PLCs, and adopting specialized OT-centric controls.
Asset Discovery and Deep Visibility
An organization cannot defend an asset it does not know exists. Building a comprehensive, automated inventory of every controller, sensor, network switch, workstation, and active software version is the starting point of any OT security initiative. This must be accomplished using passive monitoring tools that listen to network traffic spans, avoiding active scanning techniques that can overload legacy industrial components.
Network Segmentation and Industrial DMZs
Rigorous network segmentation is highly effective for reducing lateral movement by threat actors. Organizations should implement architectural frameworks like the Purdue Model to isolate the operational environment from corporate IT networks.
This is achieved by deploying industrial-grade firewalls and establishing a dedicated Industrial Demilitarized Zone (IDMZ). No direct network connections should exist between the corporate enterprise layer and the industrial control layer; all communications must terminate and authenticate within the IDMZ.
Identity and Access Management
Controlling who can interact with industrial systems is vital for preventing unauthorized configuration modifications. This requires enforcing strict access controls:
- Enforcing hardware-based multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all remote connections entering the industrial network
- Implementing role-based access control (RBAC) to restrict engineering workstation access to authorized technicians
- Utilizing privileged access management (PAM) solutions to record, monitor, and time-limit third-party vendor sessions
- Removing default or shared manufacturer credentials across all PLCs, HMIs, and field switches
Continuous Network Monitoring and Anomaly Detection
Because threats can bypass preventative perimeters, continuous monitoring of industrial network traffic is essential. Specialized OT threat detection platforms analyze native industrial protocols to establish a baseline of normal operations. Once this baseline is active, the system triggers alerts for any deviation, such as unauthorized controller configuration changes, unusual firmware downloads, or unexpected communication paths between devices.
Vulnerability Management
Patching an active PLC or HMI often requires taking critical machinery offline, creating a conflict between security and production schedules. A resilient OT vulnerability management program prioritizes vulnerabilities based on operational risk rather than theoretical severity scores. When immediate patching is impossible due to production mandates, security teams must deploy compensating controls, such as enhanced firewall rules or isolated network monitoring, to neutralize the risk until the next scheduled maintenance window.
Incident Response Planning
When an intrusion occurs, response time determines the extent of the damage. Organizations must maintain a dedicated, tested incident response plan designed specifically for the unique realities of physical operations. These playbooks must define clear procedures for isolating network segments without causing catastrophic physical equipment failures, outline emergency manual override steps for plant operators, and establish coordinated communication paths between IT security teams, engineering staff, and external regulatory bodies.
OT Security Frameworks and Standards
Building a resilient defense for industrial operations requires moving away from ad-hoc security measures and aligning with structured, internationally recognized compliance frameworks. These standards provide a common blueprint for both engineers and cybersecurity analysts to assess risk, define security levels, and enforce structural controls.
ISA/IEC 62443
The ISA/IEC 62443 series is globally recognized as the foundational standard for securing Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS). This framework addresses the security of operational systems throughout their entire lifecycle, providing distinct guidelines for asset owners, system integrators, and product manufacturers.
A core concept within ISA/IEC 62443 is the definition of Zones and Conduits. Organizations must group logical or physical assets with similar security requirements into distinct Zones, which are then isolated from one another. Any communication flowing between these zones must pass through clearly defined Conduits, which act as strictly controlled, monitored communication pathways that prevent lateral threat movement.
Furthermore, the standard introduces the concept of Security Levels (SL) ranging from SL 1 to SL 4:
- Security Level 1 (SL 1): Protection against casual or coincidental violation.
- Security Level 2 (SL 2): Protection against intentional violation using simple means with low resources and moderate skills.
- Security Level 3 (SL 3): Protection against intentional violation using sophisticated means with moderate resources and IACS-specific knowledge.
- Security Level 4 (SL 4): Protection against intentional violation using sophisticated means with extended resources, significant skills, and motivation, such as nation-state actors.
NIST Cybersecurity Framework and SP 800-82
The National Institute of Standards and Technology provides comprehensive guidance widely adopted across U.S. critical infrastructure. While the core NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) outlines the high-level pillars of Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover, it is paired with NIST Special Publication 800-82 (Revision 3) to bridge the gap between IT and OT.
NIST SP 800-82 delivers prescriptive engineering instructions for securing industrial control systems. It provides detailed architecture recommendations, performance impact evaluations for deploying firewalls, and tailored risk management strategies that account for the unique safety and availability requirements inherent to control loops.
CISA Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) manages the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs). Developed to help small-to-midsize operators of critical infrastructure prioritize their defense budgets, the CPGs represent a subset of highly impactful cybersecurity practices.
These goals focus on accessible, actionable outcomes, such as eliminating default passwords, ensuring asset visibility, revoking access for terminated employees, and establishing basic incident response plans. CISA actively updates these goals alongside real-time threat advisories to counter active exploits targeting domestic infrastructure.
Industries That Depend on OT Cyber Security
Every sector that physical society relies upon is fundamentally bound to the integrity of its operational technology. Because each industry utilizes distinct machinery and communication structures, their specific vulnerabilities and defense priorities vary significantly.
Manufacturing
Modern factories rely on high-velocity robotic systems, automated assembly setups, and automated guided vehicles synchronized by complex software layers. A primary driver for security in manufacturing is preventing ransomware from locking down production lines, which can incur unrecoverable overhead costs every minute a line is stagnant.
Additionally, manufacturers must protect their proprietary recipes, computer-aided design files, and precise machine calibration settings from industrial espionage.
Energy and Utilities
The electric grid is an incredibly complex machine, requiring instantaneous synchronization between power generation plants, transmission substations, and local distribution networks. Security teams in this sector focus heavily on preventing nation-state actors from gaining a foothold within control networks.
An adversary with the ability to open circuit breakers or alter transformer voltage regulations could trigger cascading blackouts, damaging physical electrical infrastructure and leaving entire populations without power.
Oil and Gas
The oil and gas industry spans upstream extraction platforms, midstream pipeline networks, and downstream refining facilities. This sector depends on extensive SCADA systems utilizing long-range radio, cellular, and satellite telemetry to monitor remote valves and pumping stations.
Security architectures here must secure these sprawling communication paths to prevent threat actors from manipulating flow pressures, disabling emergency shutdown valves, or inducing environmental spills.
Water and Wastewater
Municipal water infrastructure comprises thousands of treatment plants, storage reservoirs, and distribution loops. These facilities are frequently managed by small municipal teams with limited specialized cybersecurity budgets.
The primary vulnerability in this sector is the eradication of unauthenticated, internet-exposed HMIs. Security controls must ensure that unauthorized actors cannot manipulate chemical dosing loops, such as chlorine injections, or disrupt public water delivery.
Transportation
Rail systems, international airports, commercial maritime ports, and regional traffic management grids are entirely automated. Modern locomotives utilize automated signaling systems, while shipping ports rely on giant container cranes coordinated by terminal operating software. A breach within these OT environments can paralyze supply chain logistics, strand travelers, or cause catastrophic transport collisions.
Pharmaceuticals
Drug manufacturing operations are highly automated, requiring exact temperature control, precise chemical ratios, and immutable batch records to satisfy regulatory mandates. A security incident in a pharmaceutical facility does not necessarily have to stop production to be devastating.
If an attacker subtly modifies chemical proportions or compromises the integrity of batch tracking records, an entire production run of medication must be discarded to guarantee patient safety, causing massive financial losses and supply shortages.
Emerging Trends Shaping OT Cyber Security
The discipline of industrial cybersecurity is evolving rapidly as new technologies introduce both fresh defense capabilities and unmapped systemic risks.
Convergence of IT and OT
The integration of information technology and operational technology is no longer a forward-looking prediction; it is an active reality. Organizations are systematically linking factory floors directly to corporate data lakes to enable real-time efficiency monitoring, automatic inventory ordering, and business analytics. This convergence breaks down the historical isolation of the plant floor, requiring security teams to deploy unified, cross-domain visibility and continuous boundary tracking.
Industrial IoT Expansion
The deployment of cheap, specialized Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) sensors has escalated across industrial sites. These smart vibrations, temperature, and acoustic sensors provide maintenance teams with predictive insights to prevent machine failures.
However, these devices often communicate wirelessly over protocols like Cellular, Wi-Fi, or LoRaWAN, bypassing traditional wired perimeters. If unmanaged, they provide threat actors with hundreds of alternative, low-security entry points straight into the physical facility.
Zero Trust for Industrial Networks
The legacy model of “trust anything inside the perimeter” is being replaced by Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) tailored for industrial operations. Implementing Zero Trust in an OT context means assuming that the network is already breached.
Every user, engineering workstation, and field controller must explicitly authenticate and verify its authorization before a single command or configuration change is accepted, minimizing the window for internal lateral movement.
AI-Driven Threat Detection
Because industrial control communication protocols operate with highly predictable, repetitive patterns, they are exceptionally well-suited for behavioral analytics. Security teams are increasingly utilizing machine learning models to map out normal facility operations.
These advanced platforms analyze thousands of concurrent PLC interactions, instantly flagging micro-anomalies, such as an engineering command issued outside of normal maintenance hours or an anomalous sequence of data requests, long before traditional signature-based tools recognize an attack.
Federal Infrastructure Protection Initiatives
Government bodies globally have intensified their oversight of critical infrastructure resilience. Regulatory agencies are moving away from voluntary guidelines toward mandatory, enforceable cybersecurity directives. This shift is driving significant capital investments into verified asset tracking, mandatory incident reporting portals, and rigorous third-party supply chain audits across all critical operating sectors.
Best Practices for Building a Strong OT Security Program
Establishing a resilient defense posture across industrial facilities requires balancing technical engineering controls with continuous operational discipline.
- Maintain a Complete and Living Asset Inventory: Utilize continuous, passive network discovery tools to automatically log every PLC, HMI, smart sensor, and network switch. This inventory must map out communication paths and software versions without sending active, intrusive scan packets that could stall fragile legacy equipment.
- Enforce Strict Network Segmentation: Implement a hard architectural boundary between the corporate IT enterprise and the industrial control environment. Ensure all communications terminate within a dedicated Industrial DMZ, and prohibit any direct, unproxied links between corporate workstations and field controllers.
- Isolate and Monitored Remote Access: Eliminate all persistent, always-on remote connections into the plant floor. Require multi-factor authentication for all external connections, and utilize secure, time-limited jump hosts that record and audit all third-party vendor sessions.
- Deploy OT-Specific Network Monitoring: Implement deep packet inspection tools capable of reading native industrial protocols. Establish an operational baseline to continuously monitor for anomalous behavior, unauthorized firmware uploads, or modifications to device logic.
- Implement Role-Based Access Control: Restrict administrative and engineering application privileges to verified personnel. Ensure that engineering workstations require unique user authentication rather than relying on shared, generic plant floor credentials.
- Formulate a Dedicated OT Incident Response Plan: Construct a localized incident response playbook that prioritizes physical safety and process availability. Regularly run tabletop exercises involving both cyber analysts and plant engineers to practice manual override procedures and containment strategies.
- Conduct Regular, Non-Disruptive Security Assessments: Perform periodic architectural reviews, configuration audits, and passive vulnerability analysis. Align these reviews directly with established frameworks like ISA/IEC 62443 to identify operational gaps.
- Train Plant Personnel on Cyber Awareness: Deliver practical training to floor engineers and field technicians regarding physical security vectors. Focus on the risks of unauthorized USB usage, the identification of social engineering attempts, and the proper protocols for reporting anomalous equipment behavior.
- Audit the Digital Supply Chain: Evaluate the cybersecurity controls of original equipment manufacturers, third-party integrators, and onsite contractors. Enforce strict verification standards for all incoming device firmware and software patches before they are introduced into production environments.
- Establish a Multi-Disciplinary Governance Team: Break down operational silos by forming a unified security committee that includes corporate IT security professionals, automation engineers, safety officers, and plant managers to align cybersecurity initiatives with operational realities.
The Future of Operational Technology Cyber Security
Operational technology cybersecurity has evolved into a critical pillar of corporate survival and national defense. As industrial ecosystems continue to integrate cloud platforms, edge computing, and smart automation to maintain economic competitiveness, the traditional boundaries of physical security have dissolved. Defending a facility is no longer just about guarding gates and fencing perimeters; it requires securing the digital bits that command physical machinery.
The fundamental objective moving forward is building true operational resilience. Organizations must accept that perimeters will be tested and individual systems may be compromised. The true test of a modern industrial enterprise lies in its capability to detect an intrusion instantly, contain the threat within an isolated segment, and maintain core safety operations without dropping offline.
By committing to deep visibility, strict network isolation, continuous behavioral monitoring, and a unified culture of safety between IT and engineering teams, enterprises can confidently capitalize on digital transformation while safeguarding the critical services that society depends on every day.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the primary difference between IT and OT security?
IT security focuses on data confidentiality and protecting corporate networks, applications, and business files. OT security prioritizes human safety, system availability, and process reliability, ensuring that the physical machinery managing real-world operations remains functional and stable.
Why can’t traditional IT security tools be used on OT networks?
Traditional IT tools often rely on active network scanning and automatic endpoint patching. In an OT environment, active scanning can overload legacy PLCs and cause them to crash, while unverified automated patches can introduce latency or incompatibilities that stop an active production line.
What is an air gap, and does it still exist?
An air gap is the total physical isolation of an industrial network from external networks and the internet. In modern industrial operations, true air gaps have largely disappeared due to the business requirement to connect plant floors to corporate systems for data analytics, remote maintenance, and efficiency tracking.
How does ransomware impact an OT environment if it only infects IT systems?
Even if ransomware only encrypts corporate IT systems, companies often choose to manually shut down their physical OT operations out of caution. This is typically done because they lack the network visibility to verify if the malware has crossed into the control plane, or because critical operational dependencies, such as automated billing or logistics systems, have been knocked offline.
What is the Purdue Model in OT security?
The Purdue Model is an industry-standard architectural framework that segments enterprise and industrial control networks into hierarchical layers. By separating assets into distinct functional zones, ranging from physical field devices up to corporate office networks, it allows organizations to implement effective security controls and firewalls between layers.